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ABSTRACT
Although there are several general prescriptions for managers to follow in developing an information security system, these
recommendations typically assume a relatively centralized, homogeneous organization with a culture that is conducive to
compliance with documented rules and procedures. This paper describes a research project that is intended to understand how
the IS functional structure affects the development and implementation of an information security system. Commonly-used
guides, for developing an information security system, along with their imbedded assumptions about organizational structure
are discussed. Elements comprising the IS functional structure are introduced, followed by discussion of the potential
relationships among these elements and the elements of an information security system. Finally, a research project is
described that will lead to a better understanding of these relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
Information security has become an important aspect of IT management in recent years. One place that managers can look for
guidance is to the various security frameworks and “best practices” guidelines available through a number of organizations.
At this time, there is no lack of general prescriptions for how an organization should secure its systems. What may be
lacking, however, is a way for management to understand how best to apply these recommendations to the various complex
organizational arrangements that exist in most modern firms.
INFORMATION SECURITY SYSTEM
An information security system, for the purposes of this paper, consists of four related components: Security policies,
security standards, security procedures, and security practices. These first three components are listed in increasing level of
detail, each level describing more specifically how the organization should deal with security issues. The last component,
security practices, is concerned with how members of the organization actually behave with regards to information security.
Policies define the major security issues for the organization, describing general courses of action. For example, to reduce the
threat of email-borne viruses, the organization may have a policy that no executable files will be sent or received via email. A
security standard defines in more detail how this is to be done. Continuing with the previous example, the organization may
set a security standard that all executable files will be blocked by the mail server. A security procedure defines the technology
and/or process that will implement the security standards. The security procedure in this example would be to implement a
setting on the mail server to block all emails containing attachments with certain executable file types. Finally, the security
practice is concerned with how members of the organization, including users and IT staff, comply with the security
procedures. For example, users in the organization, as a way of being able to receive executable files via email, may setup
mail accounts with other providers (e.g., Hotmail) and then receive mail from that email provider while at work and thereby
not actually comply with the security policy. An effective information security system ultimately depends on the actions of
its organizational members.
SECURITY MANAGEMENT MODELS
Security models provide guidance to the development of an information security system. Two widely-used security models
were developed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). The NIST model, which is an approach described in a series of “special publications” (available at
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http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html),  is  used  as  a  guide  within  the  U.S.  federal  government  and  other
agencies.
Another widely-used model is the ISO 17799 model. This model is associated with an internationally-recognized certification
provided to organizations that meet the standards presented in the model. This model is widely referenced in Europe, where
ISO certification is an important factor in many business relationships.
Other recommendations and guidelines are available from CERT and IETF, as well as from a multitude of security
consultants and hardware and software vendors. A common feature of many of these guidelines and models is the
recommendation that a security policy or plan include identifying and assessing information assets and risks to those assets,
determining appropriate controls (both technical and operational), implementing those controls, and auditing compliance
after implementation. A further assumption is that the results of all the above be formally documented.
Imbedded in these recommendations, then, are assumptions about the way the firm is organized and functions. It appears that
these guidelines and models would best fit organizations that are relatively centralized, do not contain too many disparate
organizational units and systems, and have a culture conducive to compliance with formal policies and procedures. However,
this is not the case for many contemporary firms. Is it possible to have other organizational configurations and still have
effective information security systems? A question similar to this was posed as part of an industry survey in 2002.
Information Security magazine conducted a survey of firms of all different sizes, and asked about their information security
efforts (Briney and Prince, 2002). There were significant differences in how small and large organizations used security
policies and allocated resources to security efforts. While the results of this survey make it difficult to determine the precise
factors that influence security efforts, there appears to be a relationship with the centralization and complexity of the
organization.
ENTERPRISE-LEVEL INFORMATION SYSTEMS  STRUCTURE AND THE STRUCTURE OF IS SECURITY
There is a substantial body of research on IS structure, divided into two large categories: that which describes the
technological elements of IS structure and that which describes the organizational elements of IS structure.  Literature related
to the technological elements of IS structure has highlighted range and reach (Keen, 1991; Broadbent and Weill, 1997),
standardization (Ross, 2003), and centrality (Fiedler, et al., 1996; Ahituv, et al., 1989; Leifer, 1988; Ein-Dor and Segev,
1982) of organizational systems as key technological structure constructs.
Range refers to the breadth of IS services that can be delivered across the organization. Reach describes the pervasiveness of
these services across the organization. Range and reach taken together comprise two main aspects of technological
complexity1. IS standardization refers to organizational specifications which limit the number of different technologies, data,
processes, and systems utilized in the organization. The level of centrality refers to the geographic concentration of
processing and storage of enterprise data.
A significant body of IS structure research has examined organizational elements of structure (Sambamurthy and Zmud,
1999; Brown and Bostrom, 1994; Brown, 1997; Olson and Chervany, 1980). Much of this literature has focused on locus of
control of IS decisions. This focus on locus of control has led to research that has identified structural modes for organizing
the IS function (for example centralized, decentralized, and federal organizations as described by Sambamurthy and Zmud,
1999). However, this research has not been particularly effective for describing more than high-level differences between
firms. Given that most organizations are federal organizations (Sambamurthy and Zmud, 1999), utilizing this framework for
describing differences firms’ security management practices is unlikely to yield much promise.
The organizational theory literature has outlined three important constructs for describing structure: complexity/
differentiation, formalization, and centralization (Pugh, et al., 1968; Reimann, 1974). The literature describes four types of
complexity/differentiation (Damanpour, 1996; Blau, 1970; Mileti, et al., 1977): occupational, spatial, vertical, and horizontal.
Occupational differentiation refers to the number of different job titles that exist in the firm. Spatial differentiation describes
the extent of geographically different locations in the firm. Vertical differentiation refers to the number of different
hierarchical levels in the organization. Horizontal differentiation refers to the number of different organizational subunits that
report to the chief executive officer. Formalization refers to the extent to which written rules and procedures specify the roles
and interactions of organizational members. Finally, centralization refers to the organizational level where decision-making
occurs.
1 In much the same way that the project complexity literature highlights the number of elements and interactions among those
elements as key components of project complexity (William, 1999; Baccarini, 1996; Wood, 1986).
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Each of these organizational structure variables can be applied to the IS function (Brown and Bostrom, 1994). IS complexity
or differentiation would refer to the extent to which there are many different job titles or organizational specialties in the IS
function, the number of different hierarchical levels on the IS organization, the number of different sub-organizational units
which report to the chief information officer, and the number of geographically distinct sites that must be managed by the IS
organization. Formality would describe the extent to which written rules and procedures define organizational roles and
activities. Centralization would include both the level at which IS decisions are made and whether these decisions are made
by business executives or IS executives.
A further examination of the organizational theory literature highlights the relationships among these variables. Although
there is some disagreement concerning the dimensionality of the structure construct, there is general consensus that
complexity is positively related to formality and both are negatively related to centralization. One interpretation of this is as
the complexity of the organization increases it becomes more difficult to maintain control through centralization. Instead,
control is exercised by empowering employees to make decisions, but formalizing or specifying how those decisions are to
be made.
Consistent with our discussion of enterprise-level IS structure, we conceptualize the structuring of IS security policies,
standards, procedures, and practices in terms of formality of IS security policies and standards and centralization of
procedures and practices.
PRELIMINARY RESEARCH MODEL AND SAMPLE PROPOSITIONS
The theoretical underpinning of this research has its roots in the structural contingency theory, which presents the argument
that the appropriateness of an organizational structure is contingent on organizational and environmental characteristics.
Although one might imagine many relevant contingencies2, we examine the effect of various enterprise-level IS structure
variables on the structuring of IS security policies, standards, procedures, and practices. Utilizing structural contingency
theory as a lens, we develop propositions that highlight enterprise-level IS structure constructs as important determinants of
IS security structure.
A preliminary research model is presented below (see Figure 1). We theorize that enterprise-level IS structure variables
impact the structuring of IS security policies, standards, procedures, and practices either directly or as modifiers of the
relationship between how IS security is structured and the effectiveness of IS security system. Sample research propositions
that will be examined include:
· Technical complexity is positively related to the degree of formalization of information security policies and standards.
· Technical complexity is negatively related to the degree of centralization of information security procedures and
practices.
· Organizational complexity is positively related to the degree of formalization of information security policies and
standards.
· Organizational complexity is negatively related to the degree of centralization of information security procedures and
practices.
· The extent of organizational information security education is positively related to the degree of formalization of
information security policies and standards.
· The extent of organizational information security education is negatively related to the degree of centralization of
information security procedures and practices.
The relationships among the constructs specified in the research model will be examined in stages. During the first stage, the
relationships among complexity, formalization of security policies and standards, centralization of procedures and practices,
and information security education will be examined. In the second stage, the relationships among formalization of security
policies and standards, centralization of procedures and practices, information security education, and the effectiveness of the
security system will be assessed. Additionally, the moderating effects of organizational formalization, technical
standardization, organizational centralization, and technical centrality will be examined in stage two.
2 For example Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) highlight several contingencies which impact locus of control.
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Figure 1 – Preliminary Research Model
METHODOLOGY
The research presented in this paper is exploratory in nature. We will first concentrate on the antecedents of the effectiveness
of the security system: technical and organizational complexity, formalization, and centralization. Frameworks for
conceptualizing the security constructs presented in this paper and metrics for operationalizing the underlying variables are in
the process of being formalized. The development of such metrics and frameworks will require a three-stage research project.
During the first stage, conceptual frameworks will be developed along with specific hypotheses. Building upon a foundation
of the current literature in this area, interviews will be conducted with both senior IS executives and those charged with
information security. Stage two will be comprised of efforts to develop and validate measurement instruments to
operationalize the key security management variables. Such instruments will be developed following the process prescribed
by Churchill (1979) and will be greatly aided by interactions with the executives described above. Finally, the hypotheses
will be examined in stage three. It is anticipated that the hypotheses will be tested with data gathered from a survey of large
corporations in the United States.
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